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Abstract
Every five years, the Dutch government and the poultry sector agree on how the direct costs of epi-
demics in poultry, should they occur, will be shared. In the agreement for 2005–2009 the maximum 
amount to be paid by the poultry sector was set considerably higher than in the 1999–2004 agreement. 
This increase was caused mainly by the expected financial risks associated with High-Pathogenicity 
Avian Influenza (HPAI) epidemics. In this paper we focus on elucidating the uncertain and the less 
uncertain aspects of the HPAI financial risk problem. We distinguish between (1) the probability of 
an introduction of HPAI in the Netherlands, (2) the transmission potential of HPAI in the Netherlands, 
and (3) the costs and financing issues resulting from HPAI epidemics. We argue that whereas current 
understanding allows relatively precise answers to the question ‘If there is an epidemic, how many 
farms will be affected and what will be the direct costs?’, much larger uncertainties are associated with 
the questions ‘What is the chance of an HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands?’, ‘How large will be the 
long-term government share in the direct costs?’, and ‘How large will be the indirect costs?’.
Additional keywords: financial risk, risk analysis, modelling an epidemic 
Introduction
In the Netherlands, three partners are usually involved in the financing of the direct 
costs of livestock epidemics: (1) the European Union, (2) the Dutch government, and 
(3) the farmers. Farmer organizations and the Dutch government arrange the sharing 
of direct costs in the so-called veterinary funds. Such funds exist for pigs, cattle, poul-
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try, and sheep and goats, the main livestock sectors in the Netherlands. Although they 
also cover costs of some other diseases, the funds’ size is determined mainly by the 
expected financial risk of major livestock epidemics like Foot and Mouth Disease and 
High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI). 
 The direct costs of the 2003 epidemic of HPAI in the Netherlands amounted to 
250 million euros, which covered the veterinary costs, consisting of the value of the 
culled herds, the organizational costs and the overhead costs. Of these direct costs 
11.3 million euros were borne by the poultry sector, as this was the amount at which 
the sector’s responsibility was maximized in the veterinary fund agreement for 
1999–2004. This contribution corresponded to 4% of the total direct costs. The 
contributions of the Dutch government and the European Union were 63% and 33%, 
respectively. The indirect costs of the 2003 epidemic, such as costs due to business 
interruption, (temporarily) lower prices and lost export markets, have been estimated 
much higher than the direct costs (Tacken et al., 2003). However, these costs are not 
part of the veterinary fund agreement and are fully borne by the poultry farmers and 
other chain participants involved. The same applies to the indirect costs incurred by 
other stakeholders, such as tourism, consumers, and, possibly, pig, beef and fish 
producers.
 In the veterinary fund agreement for 2005–2009 the sector’s maximum 
responsibility for direct costs is set at 30 million euros for the whole five-year period. 
The increase from 11.3 million to 30 million euros is caused mainly by the expected 
risk of HPAI epidemics. This risk was explored in a scenario analysis carried out by 
Meuwissen et al. (2005a, b) for the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
and the Product Boards for Livestock, Meat and Eggs, to inform the negotiations 
leading up to the new agreement. Eventually – based amongst other things on Koole 
et al. (2004) discussing the rather limited profitability of the poultry sector – the 30 
million euros maximum sector contribution was changed and the Dutch government 
agreed to reduce the maximum responsibility of the poultry sector for the period 
2005–2009 to 20 million euros. 
 Total financial consequences of epidemic outbreaks in a given area are the result 
of (1) the introduction of the virus into the area, (2) the subsequent spread of the virus 
from farm to farm, (3) the choice of intervention policy modulating direct costs, and 
(4) the interaction of the epidemic with the farm and regional economy, including 
price effects and indirect costs incurred by producers. Although the scenario analysis 
by Meuwissen et al. (2005a, b) does not include all these aspects, their study has been 
used as a basis for reviewing large and small uncertainties with respect to these issues 
as well as the distribution of the direct costs. The issue of indirect costs will only brie-
fly be discussed.
Probability of HPAI introduction in the Netherlands
Background
HPAI viruses belong to the category of influenza A viruses. Although influenza A 
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viruses can infect many avian and mammalian species, their natural hosts and reser-
voir are generally considered to be free-living aquatic birds (Alexander, 2000). From 
time to time, inter-species transmission events cause severe outbreaks of influenza in 
chickens and turkeys. Up to now, inter-species transmission events leading to massive 
mortality have been limited to specific subtypes of the virus (H5 and H7). It appears 
that under certain circumstances these subtypes may transform from a relatively 
harmless state, in which they can multiply in the trachea and gastrointestinal tract 
only, to a state where they can multiply systemically.
 Some researchers have suggested that outbreaks of HPAI may have become more 
prevalent over the last 15 years. Indeed, whereas only 9 outbreaks of HPAI have been 
described in the period 1959–1990, there have been more than 15 outbreaks of HPAI 
since (Alexander, 2000; Capua & Alexander, 2004; Lee et al., 2005). This has given 
some credibility to the suggestion that the worldwide incidence of HPAI outbreaks 
has increased over the past 15 years. On the other hand, the total number of reported 
outbreaks remains fairly small, and it is quite conceivable that reporting bias is (partly) 
responsible for the observed increase. Alternatively, it is also conceivable that the 
number of introductions has remained (more or less) constant but that the conse-
quences of a primary introduction have become much more serious (i.e., much larger 
subsequent outbreaks). All in all, the evidence that the risk of HPAI introduction in 
poultry has increased remains fragmentary. For an overview of the available evidence 
we refer to Koch & Elbers (2006). In our scenario study (Meuwissen et al., 2005a, b) 
we considered a range of different values for the probability of introduction. In this 
paper we focus on a scenario in which on average one introduction occurs every five 
years in a poultry-dense area.
The introduction of HPAI virus
In principle, introductions of HPAI viruses in poultry may occur via two routes. 
Firstly, it may be that pre-existing highly pathogenic viruses in the aquatic reservoir 
are directly introduced into poultry. Secondly, it may be that viruses of low pathogenicity 
(LPAI) are introduced into poultry where they subsequently transform into a state of 
high pathogenicity. 
 How long it takes before a virus of low pathogenicity transforms into a highly 
pathogenic one is unknown. The available data from previous epidemics suggest that 
the time to transform may vary highly. An example of a virus of low pathogenicity 
that circulated for considerable time before transformation took place is the virus 
H5N2 in chickens in Pennsylvania in 1983. The outbreak started in April and caused 
only limited mortality. It took until October of the same year before the virus had 
transformed into a state of high pathogenicity (Alexander, 2000). In many other cases, 
however, the virus of low pathogenicity circulated for a relatively short time, or could 
not be identified at all. An example of a high-pathogenicity outbreak is presented 
by the outbreak of H7N7 in the Netherlands in 2003. In this case no virus of low 
pathogenicity was found. 
 The risk of an introduction of influenza viruses from the aquatic reservoir into 
poultry is not well understood. At present the following aspects are often implicated 
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as possible risk factors for the introduction of HPAI into poultry:
– Outdoor housing;
– Close proximity of poultry to aquatic birds;
– A high local farm density; 
– Production systems with a continuous supply and removal of birds.
 Although these factors intuitively make sense, there is surprisingly little convincing 
evidence. In part this is due to the difficulties of performing adequate epidemiological 
studies during a calamity. 
 Due to a scarcity of reliable quantitative evidence, it is not possible at present to 
estimate the risk of introduction of HPAI in the Netherlands with any useful precision. 
In order to explore the financial risk due to future HPAI epidemics, one therefore 
needs to resort to investigating a number of different scenarios, each corresponding 
to a different assumed risk of introduction of HPAI.
Modelling approach
Modelling an epidemic
Owing to the large number of farms that were affected in the 2003 epidemic 
(Stegeman et al., 2004), many data from that epidemic are available that yield 
powerful information for the calibration of mathematical models describing the 
between-farm transmission of HPAI in the Netherlands. Such models describe the 
possible epidemic outcomes that may result, given that an introduction of the virus 
has taken place. The availability of such a calibrated model description enables us to 
examine the theoretical efficacy of alternative intervention strategies as well as other 
‘what–if’ questions. 
 The modelling approach was as follows. A mathematical model was used to 
describe the between-farm transmission, focusing on the transmission that remains 
after the implementation of intervention measures required by EU directives (‘EU 
strategy’), i.e., culling the infected and contact farms and establishing surveillance 
(3 km) and protection (10 km) zones around such farms. The model consists of a 
‘transmission kernel’ (see e.g. Keeling et al., 2001), defined as the probability of virus 
transmission between an infected and a susceptible farm as a function of the distance 
between these two farms. This transmission kernel can be estimated from epidemic 
data using Maximum-Likelihood estimation as explained by Ferguson et al. (2001). 
Using the estimated transmission kernel and the location data for all poultry farms 
in the Netherlands, we simulated the spatial propagation of HPAI epidemics. The 
calculations involved many realizations for each given scenario, leading to a sample 
of the distribution of epidemic outcomes (Figures 1–3). In each of the realizations the 
epidemic was started by assigning the first infection to a different farm. The numbers 
of realizations used were 150 in Figures 1 and 3, and 850 in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1. Frequency distribution of the modelled size of the HPAI outbreak in terms of total number of 
culled farms in the Gelderland Valley, using data from the 2003 epidemic. Intervention measures applied 
as required by EU directives. 
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of the modelled size of the HPAI outbreak in terms of total number 
of culled farms in the remainder of the Netherlands, using data from the 2003 epidemic. Intervention 
measures applied as required by the EU directives.
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Figure 3. Frequency distribution of the modelled size of the HPAI outbreak in terms of total number of 
culled farms in the Gelderland Valley, using data from the 2003 epidemic. Interventions according to the 
EU strategy plus culling in a radius of 1 km around the affected farms.
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Modelling the costs
In order to simulate the 2005–2009 direct costs for the Netherlands as a whole we 
first transformed the epidemiological data for each region and the control strategy into 
economic parameters. Next, a Monte Carlo simulation model (@Risk in Excel; Anon., 
2002) was developed with essentially three inputs: (1) the number of HPAI epidemics 
in the Netherlands during a five-year period, (2) the region(s) of occurrence, and (3) 
the relevant cost distributions. In the Monte Carlo simulation model a Poisson distri-
bution reflects the uncertainty about the number of epidemics. The region in which 
an epidemic occurs is simulated by a discrete probability distribution. Direct cost data 
are reflected by cumulative probability distributions with parameters covering the full 
cost distributions as derived from the epidemiological data. Results are based on 1000 
iterations.
Transmission potential of HPAI in the Netherlands
The risk of between-farm transmission of a virus like HPAI is best measured by the 
basic reproduction number, R0, a central epidemiological parameter that quantifies 
the potential for transmission (Anderson & May, 1991). R0 is defined mathematically 
as the expected number of secondary infections (i.e., secondary ‘infected farms’ in the 
present context) caused by one primary infection (i.e., primary ‘infected farm’) through-
out its infectious period in a naïve host population. In our context ‘a naïve host popu-
lation’ refers to a population of poultry farms without a (recent) history of (highly 
pathogenic) AI infections. In our model as described above, a local R0 can simply be 
calculated for each particular farm by totalling the probabilities of transmission to all 
other farms (as determined by the transmission kernel). 
 The transmission dynamics of any infectious agent exhibits a profound change of 
character as a function of the value of R0. If each case of infection (infected farm in 
our context) generates on average at least one new case of infection (i.e., R0 > 1), intro-
ductions of the infection will lead either to large outbreaks or to outbreaks that are 
small because they are terminated early simply by chance. If R0 < 1, the transmission 
chain will never be able to maintain itself and outbreaks are always small. 
 We note that because of this ‘threshold behaviour’ around the threshold value R0
= 1, the impact of interventions in disease transmission is hardly ever proportional to 
the invested intervention effort. For example, if R0 can be reduced to values below 1 
by a small extra intervention effort, this small extra effort has a very large impact. In 
contrast, a large control effort that fails to achieve such a reduction will have a much 
smaller relative impact.  
 A very important epidemiological determinant that can be estimated directly from 
agricultural census data is the local farm density. To a large extent, this quantity 
determines the local R0 described above. This local transmission potential increases 
with increasing local farm density. Given the threshold behaviour of the transmission 
process, two types of areas can be distinguished. An area of low risk, with a (relatively) 
low farm density, where R0 < 1 and thus not large enough to cause sustained trans-
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mission, and an area of high risk, with a high farm density, where R0 > 1 so that 
additional interventions are required to achieve epidemic control.
 By calculating the local R0 for all farms in the Netherlands, we identified the 
Gelderland Valley (an area in the Gelderland province) as the most important high-risk 
area in the Netherlands. Figure 1 shows the model results for this area under the ‘EU 
strategy’ of intervention described above. Here we focus on the distribution of out-
break size, where we define outbreak size as the total number of culled farms through-
out the epidemic. The distribution of outbreak size (Figure 1) consists of two separate 
parts, one part with relatively small outbreak sizes that correspond to outbreaks that, by 
chance, terminated relatively early, and a second part with large sizes corresponding to 
large epidemics. The fact that under EU intervention policy there is a probability that 
large epidemics may occur confirms that the Gelderland Valley is a high-risk area. A 
second (smaller) high-risk area is located in the south of the Netherlands. Both areas 
were heavily affected during the 2003 epidemic. All outbreak sizes modelled for the 
remainder of the Netherlands (Figure 2) are small, indicating the low-risk character of 
that part of the country.
 The outbreak size distribution in the Gelderland Valley for a more aggressive 
intervention strategy is presented in Figure 3. This aggressive strategy consisted of the 
‘EU strategy’ combined with the additional measure – initiated after a high-risk period 
assumed to last 21 days – of pre-emptive culling of all farms within a 1-km radius 
around the infected farms. The results illustrate that because of a high farm density in 
this area even strategies that include pre-emptive culling are not able to terminate the 
epidemic without having to cull in a large part of the area. On the other hand, we did 
find that pre-emptive culling leads to a reduction of the expected length of the epidemic 
(Meuwissen et al., 2005a, b).
 With respect to the transmission potential of HPAI in the Netherlands we arrive 
at the following conclusions. Owing to the availability of the 2003-epidemic data, a 
theoretical framework is available in which ‘what–if’ questions on between-farm HPAI 
transmission in the Netherlands can be addressed, given that an introduction of the 
virus has taken place. Analyses within this framework suggest that highly pathogenic 
AI viruses spread rapidly in two defined poultry-dense areas in the Netherlands, and 
that current options for control measures are unlikely to be able to halt an ongoing 
epidemic in these two areas. However, the more pre-emptive culling is applied, the 
shorter the expected duration of the epidemic.
Costs and financing of HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands 
Direct costs of livestock epidemics refer to the veterinary costs directly related to 
the control of an epidemic, i.e., the value of culled animals, and organizational and 
overhead costs. These types of costs are fairly straightforward to assess. For the 2003-
epidemic of HPAI, during which 30 million animals were killed, direct costs amoun-
ted to 250 million euros, or 8 euros per animal. Transferring this amount to the sce-
narios for the Gelderland Valley presented above, results in direct costs of 82 million 
euros in case of additional culling within a radius of 1 km around infected farms and 
Uncertainties in predicting future costs of HPAI epidemics
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Table 1. Simulated direct costs of HPAI epidemics using two control strategies, for two regions in the 
Netherlands.
Region EU strategy   EU strategy + culling in a 1-km radius
 Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -    (€ ∑ 106)   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gelderland Valley 76 0.2 100 82 5 144
Remainder of 0.4 0.2 2.4 1 0.2 9.4 
the Netherlands
Table 2. Simulated distribution of average and maximum direct costs of HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands, 
and probability of payment, in two scenarios, over the period 2005–2009.
Contributors Default scenario   More optimistic scenario 1
 Direct costs  Probability of Direct costs Probability of
   payment    payment
 Average Maximum   Average Maximum
 - - - -   (€ ∑ 106)  - - - - -   - - - -  (€ ∑ 106)  - - - - -
Dutch poultry farmers 18 30 0.63  10 30 0.39
Dutch government 34 430 0.56  6 145 0.27
European Union 28 248 0.63  9 94 0.39
Total 2005–2009 80 708 –  25 269 –
1 As the default scenario, but with a reduced number of epidemics (1 every 10 years) and reduced costs 
  per animal (5 instead of  € 8).
in 76 million euros if the EU strategy is strictly applied. These are average values. Table 
1 also lists the minimum and maximum costs, as well as the (much lower) costs in the 
‘remainder’ (excluding the second high-risk area mentioned above) of the Netherlands.
 Indirect costs are much more difficult to assess. This even holds for relatively 
straightforward aspects such as business interruption. Losses due to business interrup-
tion depend on uncertain factors of, for instance, farmers finding another job. Also 
losses due to price effects depend on many uncertain aspects, such as the response 
of other countries. Countries free from HPAI may induce short-term or longer-term 
export limitations or they may even expand their own production capacity, thereby 
permanently reducing the export opportunities for the country facing HPAI. Indirect 
costs are not compensated by governments. In general, they are considered to be too 
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complicated for any risk-financing (e.g. insurance) scheme. 
 In the 2005–2009 scenario analysis of the direct costs, the following default 
scenario was defined:
1. On average one HPAI introduction every five years, occurring either in the 
 Gelderland Valley (96%) or in the high-risk area in the south of the Netherlands 
 (4%); 
2. Additional culling within 1 km from infected farms controls epidemics;
3. Direct costs include 8 euros per animal killed. 
 Table 2 presents the results for the default scenario and for a more optimistic 
scenario (i.e., with fewer epidemics occurring and with lower costs per animal). 
Average 2005–2009 costs are 80 million euros in the default scenario and 25 million 
euros in the more optimistic scenario. Maximum costs are estimated at 708 million 
euros and 269 million euros in the default and the more optimistic scenario, 
respectively.
 With respect to the distribution of the 2005–2009 costs, both scenarios assume 
an EU-share of 35% and a ’Dutch share’ of 65%. Dutch poultry farmers contribute up 
to a maximum of 30 million euros. Table 1 shows that the Dutch government together 
with the European Union pays on average the largest part of the costs in the default 
scenario as well as in the more optimistic scenario. In the default scenario the 
European Union pays on average 28 million euros (i.e., 35%) of the direct costs of 
HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands during the period 2005–2009. The probability 
of such a payment is 0.63. For the Dutch government the probability of having to 
pay is somewhat less (0.56) but the average contribution is higher (34 million euros, 
i.e., 42%). On the other hand, there is a relatively small chance that the Dutch govern-
ment does not have to make any ‘poultry disease related payments’ in the 2005–2009 
period. Probabilities are only 0.07 in the default scenario (i.e., 0.63–0.56) and 0.11 
(i.e., 0.39–0.27) in the more optimistic situation (Table 2). 
 In case of a maximum farmer contribution of 20 million euros (not shown in 
Table 2), the average farmer contribution in the default scenario decreases from 
18 million to 12 million euros, whereas the chance for the Dutch government of 
becoming financially involved increases from 0.56 to 0.58. The probability and size 
of payments for the European Union remain 0.63 and 28 million euros, respectively. 
Such a large involvement for both the Dutch government and the European Union is 
unlikely to persist in the future.
 As to the cost issue of HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands we arrive at the following 
conclusions. The less uncertain aspects relate to the size of the direct costs and the 
short-term distribution of these costs among European Union, Dutch government and 
poultry farmers. The more uncertain aspects are the longer-term financial participation 
of the Dutch government and the European Union in the sharing of costs and the size 
of the indirect costs.
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued that, on the one hand, some of the determinants of the 
Uncertainties in predicting future costs of HPAI epidemics
204 NJAS 54-2, 2006
financial risk resulting from HPAI epidemics are very uncertain. Specifically, the 
probability of a primary introduction of HPAI in poultry, its long-term economic 
effects and the long-term distribution of costs cannot be determined with much precision. 
On the other hand, the availability of a calibrated model description of between-farm 
transmission enables us to calculate probability distributions of size and duration 
of an epidemic that is likely to ensue once HPAI has been introduced into a poultry-
dense area. Based on these distributions it is possible to calculate a probability distri-
bution of direct economic cost associated with such an epidemic. 
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